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Corporate governance research in Nigeria: a review 
 
 






This paper is a literature review of the recent corporate governance research in Nigeria. It identifies the 
recent advances and challenges in the literature and suggest some directions for future research. A 
comprehensive review of the recent corporate governance literature is important because it provides a 
basis to compare the corporate governance experience in Nigeria with the corporate governance 
experience in other African countries and developing countries. The findings from the literature review 
reveal that the board of directors is the most explored corporate governance determinant in the Nigerian 
corporate governance literature. Most studies focus on some corporate governance determinants, and 
ignore other corporate governance determinants in firms. There is some consensus that corporate 
governance failure in Nigeria is caused by multiplicity of factors such as lack of political will by the 
government to enforce corporate governance laws, deliberate refusal to comply with existing corporate 
governance laws by politically connected firms, weak compliance by firms, weak enforcement by 
regulators, and conflicting codes in the country’s corporate governance codes. Also, recent corporate 
governance studies do not systematically build on previous corporate governance studies. Regarding 
methodology, most Nigerian corporate governance studies are merely experimenting different methods 
of analyses without advancing the literature in a significant way. The study also finds that the 2018 
Nigerian code of corporate governance (NCCG) solves some problems and create new problems for 
Nigerian firms.  
 
Keywords:  Corporate governance, Nigeria, Board size, Firm performance, Board of directors, CEO 
duality, Africa, Regulation, Ownership Structure, Audit committee, Earnings management, Financial 
reporting 









This paper reviews the Nigerian corporate governance literature. It analyses the current state of 
corporate governance research in Nigeria, and provides some directions for future research on CG in 
Nigeria.1 Corporate governance is defined as the system of rules, practices, and processes by which 
firms are directed and controlled (Raut 2003). This is the working definition of corporate governance 
used in this review article. Corporate scandals around the world and the East Asian crisis coupled with 
the poor performance of many corporations in Africa have led to increased focus on corporate 
governance in emerging economies. Notable examples are the corporate governance failures in Nigeria 
(e.g., Oceanic bank in 2010 and Cadbury), U.S. (e.g., Enron in 2001 and Arthur Andersen in 2002), and 
India (e.g., Satyam Computers in 2009). 
The CG literature is extensive both in terms of number of studies and in terms of depth of research 
inquiry. The CG literature is currently dominated by studies examining corporate governance and firm 
performance in the US, Europe and cross-country contexts. These studies largely focus on the 
relationship between ownership structure, the composition of the board of directors and firm 
performance (see Johnson and Greening 1999; Xu and Wang 1999; Core et al. 1999; Bhagat and Bolton 
2008). Many African CG studies are largely ignored or unnoticed in the mainstream CG literature 
mainly because of the outlets they are published in. For this reason, the findings from African studies 
have been exempted from mainstream academic corporate governance discourse. For instance, a quick 
search on Google Scholar using CG keywords such as ‘corporate governance’, ‘Africa’, ‘Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ will reveal that no African CG articles have been published in a 4-star ranked journal such as 
the ‘Academy of Management Journal’, ‘Academy of Management Review’, ‘Administrative Science 
Quarterly’, ‘Journal of Management’, ‘the Journal of Finance’ and ‘Management Science’. The 
observer relying on this metric would conclude that there are no African CG studies, but this is untrue 
because another quick search on Google Scholar using the previously suggested CG keywords (and 
disregarding where the articles are published in) will reveal that Nigeria has the highest number of CG 
studies in Africa, followed by Ghana, South Africa and then Kenya – in that order. A further search 
using Nigeria* and CG* as keywords also reveal that the Nigerian CG literature is not only much but 
is also saturated, indicating that there is sufficient content to conduct a systematic literature review on 
CG in Nigeria. This observation shows that the Nigerian CG literature has reached a level of saturation 
such that a systematic review can help to consolidate the achievements in this literature and craft a 
research agenda for years to come.  
 
This paper brings together in one article the recent developments in corporate governance (CG) research 
in Nigeria, to identify the recent advances and challenges in the literature and to suggest some directions 
for future research. There is need for additional reviews of the African CG experience to identify 
uniform CG practices and CG differences in African countries to enable comparison with the experience 
of emerging economies in other continents so that some lessons can be learnt to improve CG practices 
in Africa. This can only be achieved when there is a large number of studies examining CG in several 
African contexts. Although country-specific African studies have begun to emerge in the literature (e.g. 
Sanda et al. 2010; Adekoya 2011; Dembo and Rasaratnam 2014; Ehimare et al. 2013), it is easy to 
observe that a large number of CG research have been conducted for some African countries compared 
to other African countries, and there has never been an attempt to review the current state of CG research 
in any of these countries to identify areas for improvement for future research. A comprehensive review 
of the state of CG research in a single African country has never been attempted, and the point must be 
                                                          




made that insufficient reviews of the state of CG research in emerging countries such as Nigeria, South 
African and Ghana may limit the basis for comparing the African corporate governance experience with 
the experience in other continents. 
 
Studies examining CG in the African context have shown that there are unique structural peculiarities 
and challenges in each African country that affect the corporate governance structure and outcomes in 
African corporations (Ayogu 2001; Rossouw 2005; Rwegasira 2000). Rossouw (2005) show that 
various aspects of the CG code in African countries affect how business ethics is being perceived and 
practiced in African firms. Rwegasira (2000) points out that the CG model adopted by African countries 
should be adapted to the peculiarities of each African country, and that inputs from other CG models 
should be incorporated into the current CG model if necessary to make African capital markets become 
globally competitive. Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) argue that corporate governance in many African 
countries is influenced by each country’s company codes, securities and exchange commission, stock 
exchange listing requirements, regulations and rules, among others. These few observations in the 
African CG literature require additional country-specific case studies to shed light on the CG practices 
in other African countries in order to identify the lessons learnt from these countries.  
 
This paper focus on the case of Nigeria. The last two decades witnessed the failure of many financial 
and non-financial firms in Nigeria such as Oceanic Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Nitel and Vodafone 
due to poor corporate governance. These corporate failures in Nigeria led to increased interest in 
corporate governance research in Nigeria. What makes the case of Nigeria particularly compelling is 
the large number of CG studies focusing on Nigeria, and the multiplicity of codes of corporate 
governance within the weak institutional environment plagued with corruption. Specific codes conflict 
with one another in some areas, and this will have implications for regulatory compliance by public 
firms in Nigeria (Adegbite 2013). In fact, there is the belief that managers tend to comply with the CG 
code of a stricter regulator that impose heavy fines for non-compliance while managers are less likely 
to comply with the CG code of a lax regulator. More importantly, the CG problems in Nigeria, such as 
the multiplicity of CG codes, is somewhat related to the regulatory multiplicity issues in transnational 
systems of corporate governance which is discussed in the comparative corporate governance literature. 
The comparative corporate governance literature highlight the problems faced by multinational 
corporations in complying with multiple regulations and codes in many jurisdictions (see Demaki 2011; 
Aguilera et. al. 2008; Alonso-Pauli and Perez-Castrillo 2012, for detailed discussion). However, this 
literature has paid little attention to corporate governance regulatory multiplicity in developing 
economies such as Nigeria. 
 
The discussions in this review article contributes to the CG literature in the following ways. One, it 
contributes to the literature that examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance (e.g. 
Kor and Mahoney 2005; Kroll et al. 2007). Two, by relating CG to managerial behavior, this study 
contributes to the literature that examine how certain CG structures encourage managers to influence 
their profit levels for improved firm performance (see Leuz et al. 2003; Klein 2002). Three, this review 
contributes to the literature that examine the role of institutional monitoring and corporate governance 
in improving firm performance. Finally, this review offers multiple opportunities and benefits to 
researchers and practitioners by highlighting the importance of corporate governance research in 
Nigeria and by revealing areas that need to be explored further. The remarks on the challenges and 
prospects of CG research in Nigeria in this review article are limited to issues in the literature that I find 




The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology for the review. Section 
3 presents an overview of corporate governance in Nigeria and compares the Nigerian context with the 
Western context. Section 4 discuss the theoretical model. Section 5 presents the measurement and 
estimation issues. Section 6 reviews the CG determinants and consequences. Section 7 discuss the 
weakness of the recent Nigerian corporate governance code, the implication for African countries and 
also presents some future research directions. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
The methodology for this review is as follows. The journal selection criteria were articles published in 
a journal. Only few of these studies were published in high quality journals while most of the articles 
were published in other journal outlets – both Scopus and non-Scopus journals2. The article search 
criteria were abstract search and a search on the body-of-articles. The two searches were done on the 
assumption that an article’s abstract and body would contain the dominant corporate governance 
keywords. The article exclusion criteria for this study was to exclude articles that were published as 
thesis and dissertation. A 2010 cut-off year was applied during the article search to focus on the recent 
CG developments in Nigeria that have already overtaken past CG events in the country. For example, 
there have been many NCCG revisions in the past, and all the past CG revisions are not relevant in 
explaining the most recent 2018 NCCG. Only the last revision or the last two revisions can better 
explain the recent NCCG revision. For this reason, it makes sense to begin from the post-2010 period. 
Also, the 2010 cut-off year was applied because many Nigerian CG studies began to emerge from 2010. 
The scope of this review covers only articles that (i) examine the state of CG in Nigeria, (ii) articles that 
compare the CG characteristics of Nigeria with that of other countries, and (iii) articles that explore the 
effect of CG on firm performance in Nigeria. To be included in the review, the selected articles would 
be one that explore the effect of Board characteristics, structure and composition on the performance of 
firms. Articles that examine how managers’ characteristics affect firm performance, were also 
considered.  
The articles used to conduct this review was selected electronically from the top 100 search results from 
Google scholar using the keywords “Corporate Governance Nigeria” which gives a total of 72 articles. 
Another search was conducted using the same keywords with a focus on post-2010 studies in order to 
capture the recent findings in the Nigerian CG literature. Out of the 72 articles, some papers were 
excluded either because they were anecdotal in nature or because the methods used to reach the 
conclusions in such articles were unscientific. The included articles were articles that examine the state 
of CG in Nigeria, articles that compare the CG characteristics of Nigeria with that of other countries, 






                                                          
2 Scopus is a source-neutral abstract and citation database curated by independent subject matter experts. 
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3. Overview of corporate governance in Nigeria 
3.1. Current Reality 
The current reality in Nigeria is that Nigeria has institutions that govern the behavior and activities of 
firms, but these institutions have little or no enforcement powers to discipline rule-breaking firms 
(Ahunwan 2002; Adekoya 2011). Firms do not comply with corporate governance codes especially 
firms that have a strong politician on the board of the firm (Nakpodia and Adegbite 2018). Also, the 
executives of rule-breaking firms are often politically-connected to top government officials or may 
bribe their institutional supervisor or regulator to evade sanctions (Adegbite et al. 2012). Oyejide and 
Soyibo (2001) share a similar thought on this issue, they analyze the state of corporate governance in 
Nigeria and argue that Nigeria has institutions and the legal framework needed for effective corporate 
governance, but compliance and/or enforcement is weak or non-existent in Nigeria. Another issue is the 
different interpretation of the codes of corporate governance in Nigeria, and the multiplicity of 
regulations that hinder the workings of existing corporate governance codes (Adegbite et al. 2013; 
Osemeke and Adegbite 2016). Different agents especially managers, lawyers and the courts, have 
different interpretation which affects how corporate governance is practiced in Nigeria, and this has 
been a long standing issue. 
Regarding the causes of corporate governance failures in Nigeria, Adekoya (2011) show that corporate 
governance failures in Nigeria is caused by the country’s culture of institutionalized corruption, political 
patronage and the refusal of government agencies to enforce and monitor compliance. Another cause 
of corporate governance failure is corruption in the unfavourable business environment (Letza 2017). 
Focusing on corporate insiders, Nwidobie (2016) argue that the corporate governance problems in 
Nigeria are caused by self-interested controlling shareholders as well as controlling shareholders who 
are also directors. Abdulmalik and Ahmad (2016a) show that corporate governance failures in Nigeria 
are caused by conflicting regulatory laws, the ineffectiveness of the board of directors and lack of 
auditor independence arising from the nature of firm ownership structure in Nigeria. Osemeke and 
Adegbite (2016) show that conflict among the various codes of corporate governance and regulatory 
multiplicity are causes of corporate governance failures in Nigeria. Figure 1 below illustrates the current 




3.2. The recent Nigerian code of corporate governance (NCCG)  
Good corporate governance is good for business. It can attract foreign investment to Nigerian firms. 
But for this to happen, investors need to trust the legal system in Nigeria and its ability to protect 
minority shareholders. Ahunwan (2002) show that Nigeria has been facing increasing pressure from the 
international community to adopt a good corporate governance system and a program of economic 
liberalization and deregulation to increase investors’ confidence in doing business in Nigeria. Nigeria 
has an evolving national code of corporate governance that reflect the unique socio‐political and 
economic situation in Nigeria while at the same time providing the right assurance to current and 
potential shareholders in firms (Okike 2007).  
Nigeria's peculiar institutional arrangements may influence its model and style of corporate governance 
regulation (see figure 2), and these institutions can either promote good corporate governance or can 
constitute barriers to the implementation of good corporate governance principles in Nigeria (Adegbite 
2012). It is expected that Nigeria’s code of corporate governance will be somewhat different from the 
corporate governance laws in modern economies. This is because the peculiar nature of developing 
economies, like Nigeria, will make the running of many private companies different from the 
governance processes of private companies in modern economies (Yakasai 2001), due to the weak 
institutional environment plagued with corruption as well as conflicting codes (Adegbite 2013) and 
regulatory multiplicity (Osemeke and Adegbite 2016). 
In 2018, the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) was issued for private companies, public 
companies and not-for-profit Entities. The new Code3 is made up of seven (7) parts and contains twenty-
eight (28) principles. It covers the ‘board of directors’, ‘audit’, ‘relationship with shareholders’, 
‘business conduct with ethics’, ‘sustainability’, ’transparency’ and ‘definitions’. The Code is principle-
based and requires the ‘apply or explain’ approach. All companies are required to apply the Code or 
explain the reasons for not adopting them. The rationale for using the ‘apply or explain’ approach is to 
encourage better corporate governance practices in Nigerian companies. The issuer of the Code, the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, will monitor the implementation of the Code through sectoral 
or industry regulators. Each sectoral regulator has been empowered to impose appropriate sanctions for 
violations of the Code based on sectoral or industry laws and regulations. The 2018 NCCG improves 
on the previous code in three key areas namely (i) by specifying an effective whistle-blowing framework 
for reporting any illegal or unethical behavior, (ii) by requiring companies to pay attention to 
sustainability issues including environmental, social, occupational and community health and safety 







                                                          





3.3. Corporate governance codes: comparing Nigeria and Western economies 
The 2018 NCCG is somewhat similar to the CG codes of western countries in many areas. Table 1 
below shows some comparison. 
 
Table 1: Corporate governance (CG) mechanisms 
CG mechanism  
and related literature 
Definition Adoption or Practice in 
Nigeria 










This describes the approach to 
regulating corporate governance 
Nigeria adopts the ‘apply or 
explain’ approach to CG 
regulation 
Most western countries 
such as the UK, US, 
Canada and France adopt 
the “comply or explain” 
approach. Australia 
adopts the “if not, why 
not” approach 




(see. Uadiale (2010), 
Ujunwa (2012)) 
This refers to both the type of 
directors on the board and the 
balance of skills, diversity, and 
competence. Usually the board is 
composed of independent 
directors, executive directors, non-
executive directors, the Chief 
Executive Officer, and the 
Chairman of the board 
The 2018 Nigerian code of 
corporate governance 
(NCCG) requires that there 
should be a balance of skills, 
diversity and competence on 
the board However, it did 
not specify the exact skills, 
diversity, gender and 
competence that the board 
should be composed of. 
 
In France, there must be 
at least 40% of males and 




(see. Sanda (2011)) 
The number of years an individual 
will serve as the Chief Executive 
Officer of the firm 
The 2018 NCCG did not 
specify a tenure for the CEO 
rather it requires that the 
tenure of the MD/CEO 
should be determined by the 
board. 
 
The discretion for CEO 
tenure is determined by 
the independent directors 





(see. Sanda et al 
(2010), Ujunwa 
(2012)) 
The total number of members or 
directors on the board  
The 2018 NCCG did not 
specify a minimum or 
maximum size of the board 
There is no universally 
agreed board size for 
firms in western 
countries. The discretion 
for board size lies with 
the shareholders at an 
annual general meeting 





(see. Sanda (2011), 
Uwuigbe et al 
(2018)) 
The board is considered to be 
independent if it has a large 
number of outside directors and 
fewer insiders on the board 
The 2018 NCCG require the 
appointment of independent 
directors or non-executive 
director. They should not be 
shareholders, former 
employees, family relatives 
of shareholders, among 
others. An executive director 
can be a member of a board 
sub-committee except the 
remuneration, audit, or 
nomination and governance 
committees 
 
In the UK, the members 
of the board sub-
committees are mostly 
independent directors. In 
Canada, the CG law 
require independent 
directors to be members 
of the audit and 
compensation 







Mgbame et al 
(2020), Owolabi and 
Ogbechie (2010)) 
An audit committee is a sub-
committee of the company's board 
responsible for overseeing 
financial reporting and disclosures, 
and to ensure that the information 
reported in financial statements are 
true, reliable and accurate. 
The 2018 NCCG require that 
the members of the audit 
committee of firms should 
be (i) financially literate and 
should be able to read and 
understand financial 
statements; (ii) they should 
have at least one member of 
the committee who has 
expert knowledge in 
accounting and financial 
management and be able to 
interpret financial 
statements; (iii) for private 
companies, members of the 
audit committee should be 
non-executive directors 
(NEDs), and a majority of 
them should be independent 
NEDs where possible; (iv) a 
chairman should be elected 
from amongst its members, 
and should have financial 
literacy; (v) the audit 
committee should meet at 
least once every quarter 
 
Having an audit and risk 
committee is mandatory 
in France. Both Canada 
and USA require public 
companies to have a 
Board audit committee. 
The UK requires 








(see. Ranti (2013), 
Ehikioya (2009)) 
This refers to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) holding the position 
of the Chairman of the board 
The 2018 Nigerian CG code 
does not permit the same 
person to be the company 
CEO and board Chairman 
The UK CG code does 
not permit the same 
person to be the CEO 
and Chairman while the 
US permits CEO-Chair 
duality. In the US, CEO-





(see. Ozili and 
Uadiale, (2017), 
Usman and Yero 
(2012); Obembe et 
al, 2010)) 
This refers to the number of large 
equity holding by shareholders as 
a percentage of the firm’s total 
shares. 
The 2018 NCCG did not 
make any comment on the 
amount of shares a director 
or shareholder can own in a 
firm 
In Canada, there is no 
restriction on the number 













4. Theoretical model 
 
It is useful to develop a framework to explain how corporate governance affects the survival and 
performance of firms in the economic sense. Corporate governance has traditionally been associated 
with the “agency” problem between the principal and the agent (Maher and Andersson 2000). A 
principal-agent relationship arises when the owner of the firm is not the same as the person who 
manages or control the firm (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Corporate governance 
itself describes the formal system of accountability of senior management to shareholders or 
stakeholders (Freeman and Reed 1983). Shareholders delegate the responsibility of managing the firm 
to managers, who are expected to use their specialized knowledge and the firms' resources to generate 
the highest possible return for shareholders, and to optimize value for shareholders and stakeholders in 
the long run (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Tosi Jr and Gomez-Mejia 1994). However, due to differential 
interests, managers may pursue their own objectives, such as acquiring excessive compensation that is 
not coupled with firm performance at the expense of shareholders (Dyl 1988). To prevent this, 
shareholders develop monitoring systems to constrain managers' actions so that they act in the interest 
of shareholders (Fama 1980). This monitoring mechanism involves the use of compensation contracts 
to align the interests of managers and the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Some corporate governance structures are motivated by incentive-based economic models of 
managerial behavior which may be divided into two categories: the agency model and the adverse 
selection model (Bhagat and Bolton 2008). The agency model argues that because managers are self-
interested and will take actions that hurt shareholders (Eisenhardt 1989; Core et al 1999; Mehran 1995), 
compensation incentives and contracts should be offered to managers to induce them to act in the 
interest of shareholders while managing the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Mehran 1995; Boyd 
1994). Also, ownership of the firm by the manager may be used to induce managers to act in a manner 
that is consistent with the interest of shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1983). On the other hand, the 
adverse selection model is motivated by the fact that there are the differences in the ability of managers 
to manage the firm which cannot be observed by shareholders (Myerson 1987; Bhagat and Bolton 
2008). In this case, ownership may be used to induce managers to reveal the private information they 
have about their ability to generate cash flow, which cannot be observed directly by shareholders 
(Myerson 1987).  
 
From the two models above, it is easy to see that some corporate governance structures reflect the type 
of contract that governs the relationship between shareholders and managers. Regarding firm 
performance, if managers misuse firm’s resources, a low return on assets would be generated thereby 
adversely affecting firm performance, all others things being equal. Low profits mean that there will be 
little or no dividend paid to shareholders, which may have consequences for the tenure of managers of 
the firm. One practical implication, or consequence, of the agency and adverse selection CG models for 
Nigeria is that Nigerian shareholders may unintentionally hire self-interested managers who may amass 
excessive pecuniary benefits to themselves at the expense of shareholders. To avert this, Nigerian 
shareholders may need to design effective compensation contracts to motivate managers to act in the 
interest of shareholders. Currently, the idea of monitoring managers through direct equity ownership of 
the firm or by relinquishing part-ownership of the firm to managers in Nigeria is not a common practice 
in Nigeria, and it is yet to be seen whether such practice will yield better performance among the few 
Nigerian firms that practice it. 
 
Another theoretical dimension is the conflict-signaling theory which is a combination of conflict theory 
and signaling theory. The conflict theory argues that the conflict within competing CG codes leaves 
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managers with the opportunistic tendency to comply with a less stringent code or outright non-
compliance (Osemeke and Adegbite 2016). The signaling theory, on the other hand, suggest that 
corporations with superior information transparency signal better corporate governance and better 
performance (Rotchschild and Stiglitz 1976), thus, companies that comply with CG codes signal good 
corporate governance particularly through good reporting while companies that do not comply may 
justify their non-compliance by citing ‘conflicting codes’ as the reason behind their non-compliance 
decision (Osemeke and Adegbite 2016). Given the current CG situation in Nigeria, one practical 
implication or consequence of the conflict-signaling theory for CG in Nigeria is that the board of 
directors in Nigerian firms may take advantage of the conflicting CG codes and the weak institutional 
enforcement to deliberately refuse to comply with the stringent CG codes while at the same time 
complying with the less-strict CG codes in order to signal that they are at least complying with some of 
the CG codes if not all the codes. Figure 2 below presents a model of corporate governance determinants 















5. Measurement and estimation issues 
This section provides a methodological review of the Nigerian CG literature. The criteria for selecting 
the articles used to conduct the methodological review was the post-2010 research criteria. Only articles 
published from 2010 till date were used to capture the most recent methodological developments in the 
Nigerian CG literature. See figure 3 below for number of articles reviewed per year. 
 






5.1. Multiple CG and firm performance variables 
The most widely studied corporate governance mechanisms in the Nigerian corporate governance 
literature are board size, board independence, audit strength, CEO duality and ownership structure 
while the control variables are mostly bank size and age of the firm (see Abdulazeez et al. 2016; 
Uwuigbe et al. 2018; Demaki 2018; Patrick et al. 2015). Board size is measured as the total number 
of directors on the board including executive directors and non-executive directors. Firm size is 
measured as the total assets of the company. Other studies measure firm size as the logarithm of 
total asset (Ozili and Thankom 2018; Ozili 2017). Board independence is measured by the number 
of independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. The 
higher the number of independent directors in the board, the better. Audit strength is measured as 
the ratio of total number of audit committee members divided by the total number of directors on 
the board. CEO-Chair duality refers to when the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the 
position of the Chairman of the board. Ownership structure is measured in terms of the ratio of 
direct equity shareholding of a shareholder compared to the total shareholdings (Ozili and Uadiale 
2017). 
 
Also, the most widely used measures of firm performance in the Nigerian corporate governance 
literature are return on assets (see Ozili and Uadiale 2017; Adenikinju 2012; Demaki 2018; 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Figure 3: Number of articles per year
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Uadiale 2017), net interest margin (Adekunle and Aghedo 2014; Ozili and Uadiale 2017), Tobin’s Q 
(see Gugong et al. 2014; Adenikinju 2012; Ujunwa 2012), recurring earnings power (Ozili and 
Uadiale 2017) and earnings per share (see Adefemi et al. 2018; Shittu et al. 2018). Return on asset 
(ROA) is measured as profit after tax divided by average assets. It measures the ability of firms 
to generate profit from operating assets. Return on equity (ROE) is measured as profit after tax 
divided by owners’ equity. It measures the profits that shareholders would receive on their 
invested capital. Net interest margin (NIM) measures the profit from interest-generating activities. 
The Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of equity plus the market value of debt divided by 
the replacement cost of all assets. Recurring earnings power (REP) measures the ability of a firm 
to generate income or profits overtime assuming all current operational conditions remain 
constant, and is measured as pre-provision profit excluding net income from financial instruments 
and sale of securities and tax to average asset ratio. Earnings per share (EPS) represents how much 
money shareholders would receive for each share of stock they own if the company distributed all 
of its net income for the period. It is measured as the difference between a company's net income 
and dividends paid for preferred stock divided by the average number of shares outstanding. Table 
2 summarises the CG variables. 
 
Table 2: Multiple CG and firm performance variables 




Board size, board 
independence, audit 
strength, CEO duality 
and firm ownership 
structure  
 see Abdulazeez et al. 
2016; Uwuigbe et al. 
2018; Demaki 2018; 




 Return on assets; return 
on equity; net interest 
margin; Tobin’s Q; 
recurring earnings power; 
and earnings per share. 
Ozili and Uadiale 2017; 
Adenikinju 2012; Demaki 
2018; Onakoya et al. 
2014; Abdulazeez et al. 
2016; Adekunle and 
Aghedo 2014; Gugong et 
al 2014; Ujunwa 2012; 
Adefemi et al. 2018; 
Shittu et al. 2018. 
Control 
variables 
Firm size, age of the 
firm 




5.2. Mixed methods and estimation issues 
In the empirical literature, some studies use correlation analysis to test the association between 
corporate governance and firm performance (see Okpara and Iheanacho 2014; Isaac and Nkemdilim 
2016; Obembe and Soetan 2015, etc). These studies draw conclusions based on mere correlations. One 
weakness of correlation-based corporate governance studies is that they associate correlation with 
causation when interpreting results, and this is a fundamental issue in such studies. Correlation does not 
imply causation because correlation only describes the directional association between variables. Other 
studies use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression methodology to estimate the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance (see Usman and Amran 2015; Patrick et al. 2015; 
Adigwe et al. 2016). Some studies use the t-test statistic and draw inference (Aburime 2008). Many 
studies use a combination of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and ordinary least square 
regression (see Paul et al. 2015; Amahalu et al. 2017; Adeneye and Ahmed 2015; Demaki 2018; 
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Abdulazeez et al. 2016; Ozili and Uadiale 2017; Uwuigbe et al. 2018). Only few studies use the 
generalized methods of moments (see Odeleye 2018; Abdulmalik and Ahmad 2016b; Obembe and 
Soetan 2015; Obembe et al. 2016). From the above, it is easy to see that there are multiple inconsistent 
estimation techniques and method of analyses in the Nigerian corporate governance literature. Some 
studies use a single estimation technique while other studies use a combination of different techniques 
which often produce conflicting results. These inconsistencies in CG modelling and estimations may 
explain the mixed results in the Nigerian corporate governance literature.  
 
6. Review of CG determinants and consequences 
6.1. Corporate governance determinants 
6.1.1. Board size and independence 
In theory, there is wide support for having a large board size and independent board members (Xie et 
al 2003). A small board size can increase the power of controlling shareholders to influence managers 
to act in their favour, compared to a large Board size (Eisenberg et al. 1998). For instance, Sanda et al 
(2010) argue in favour of having a board size of 10 members, and supports concentrated ownership as 
opposed to diffused equity ownership, but they did not find evidence to support the idea that boards 
with a higher proportion of outside directors perform better than other firms. Uadiale (2010) finds a 
positive association between independent boards (outside directors sitting on the board) and corporate 
financial performance. Ehikioya (2009) observes that board composition did not have a significant 
effect on firm performance while having more than one family member on the board negatively affects 
firm performance. Uwuigbe et al. (2014) find that firms with larger boards and diverse knowledge are 
more effective in discouraging earnings management than smaller boards since they are likely to have 
more independent directors with more financial expertise. Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) find that a 
large board size is detrimental to firm performance. They also observe that having outside directors did 
not help to improve firm performance. Kajola (2008) finds a positive and significant relationship 
between profitability and board size.  
Some studies advocate for the participation of women in the board of directors (Burke and Mattis 2013; 
Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Williams 2003). Proponents of gender diversity want greater women 
participation in the board of firms, and there is evidence that boards perform better when there is greater 
gender diversity (Williams 2003). In Nigeria, Damagum et al (2014) examine the impact of women in 
the board on financial reporting quality. They use a sample of 20 listed firms from 2006 to 2011. They 
find that the presence of a female director does not improve the quality of financial reporting, however, 
financial reporting quality improves as the number of women in the board increases. Taken together, 
the above studies show that the composition and structure of the board have a significant impact for 
firm performance, and the effect of board composition (or structure) for firm performance in Nigeria 
depends on the independence of the board, gender diversity on the board and board size, although there 
are mixed findings from empirical research. 
6.1.2. CEO-Chair duality 
In theory, there is a strong argument for separating the position of the Chief Executive from the position 
of the Chairman of the Board so that these two positions will be occupied by two different people. When 
there is CEO-Chair duality, the Chief Executive Officer will be accountable to himself or herself (who 
is also the Chairman). The individual will become too powerful in the board, making it difficult for the 
board to remove him or her as CEO when the firm is performing badly. Evidence from Nigerian studies 
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investigating the effect of CEO-Chair duality on firm performance in Nigeria are mixed in the literature. 
For instance, Ehikioya (2009) examines the relationship between corporate governance structure and 
firm performance for 107 listed firms in Nigeria, and find that CEO duality has a negative impact on 
firm performance. Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2007) show that listed Nigerian firms have medium-
sized boards with separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO. Uwuigbe et al (2014) examine the 
effect of corporate governance mechanism on earnings management in Nigeria from 2007 to 2011, and 
find that there is aggressive earnings management in firms where the same individual holds the position 
of CEO and Chairman of the board. The findings from the above studies show that CEO-Chair duality 
has negative effects for firm performance in Nigeria. 
6.1.3. Board audit committee 
Audit committee is a committee that oversee the financial reporting process (DeZoort and Hermanson 
2002). An effective audit committee can enhance corporate governance in firms and can make financial 
reports become more reliable for investment decisions and policy formulation (Owolabi and Dada 
2011). Miko and Kamardin (2015) suggest that the audit committee in firms can help to reduce the 
manipulation of financial reports and accounts. Shittu et al (2018) investigate the effect of audit 
committee independence, abnormal directors’ compensation and information disclosure on firm 
performance measured as price to earnings ratio. They analyze 100 listed firms and find that audit 
committee independence has a significant positive impact on firm performance, measured as price to 
earnings ratio. Odoemelam and Okafor (2018) investigate the influence of corporate governance on 
environmental disclosure for listed non-financial firms, and find that audit committee independence, 
having a Big-4 auditor, board size and industry membership have an insignificant effect on 
environmental disclosure. Fodio et al (2013) investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on reported earnings quality of listed insurance companies in Nigeria using 25 listed insurance firms 
from 2007 to 2010. They find that the size of the audit committee is negatively and significantly 
associated with earnings management while audit committee independence has a positive relationship 
with discretionary accruals. Joe Duke and Kankpang (2011) show that Nigerian firms that have an audit 
committee perform better while Uwuigbe (2013) find that firms that have an audit committee have 
higher share price. Taken together, the findings from the above studies show that having a large board 
audit committee helps to discourage earnings management and the manipulation of financial statements 
in Nigeria. 
6.1.4. Ownership structure 
Ownership structure in Nigerian firms is diverse, fragmented and complex, ranging from controlling 
ownership, family ownership, political ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership (Ozili 
and Uadiale 2017). Studies investigating the role of ownership structure on firm performance in Nigeria 
show conflicting evidence on the impact of ownership structure for firm performance. For example, 
Ehikioya (2009) show that ownership concentration has a positive impact on performance. Ojeka et al 
(2016) examine the effect of institutional shareholder engagement on the financial performance of some 
listed firms from 2011 to 2013, and find that there is no significant relationship between institutional 
shareholder engagement and firm performance during their period of analysis. Obembe et al (2016) find 
that managerial ownership did not have a significant impact on the performance of firms in both the 
linear and nonlinear estimations. Isaac and Nkemdilim (2016) examine the impact of corporate 
governance on the performance of Nigerian banks, and find a positive and significant relationship 
between directors’ equity holding and banks’ performance. Aburime (2008) finds that dispersed 
ownership did not have a significant effect on bank profitability in Nigeria. Ozili and Uadiale (2017) 
find that banks with high ownership concentration have higher return on assets, higher net interest 
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margin and higher recurring earning power while banks with dispersed ownership have lower return on 
assets but have higher return on equity. To sum, although these studies show conflicting effect of 
ownership structure on firm performance, it also shows that certain ownership structure can improve 
the performance of firms in Nigeria particularly higher ownership concentration and higher directors’ 
equity holding.  
6.1.5. Review of the theoretical literature 
Several theories have been used in the CG literature to explain the relationship between CG and firm 
performance such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, institutional 
theory, grounded theory and stewardship theory (Hart 1995; Clarke 2004). In the Nigerian CG literature, 
few studies have used theories to explain the CG-performance relationship. Other studies did not 
explicitly state what theories informs their study. The most common CG theory used in the Nigerian 
CG literature is the agency theory and stakeholder theory (see table 3 which presents a summary of 
Nigerian CG articles that use theories). The popularity of the agency theory and the stakeholder theory 
in the Nigerian CG literature is due to the dominance of these two theories in the mainstream CG 
literature, and due to the multiple stakeholder influence on the operations of firms in Nigeria. 
Table 3:  Summary of theoretical review 
 Theory Articles Theme examined 
1. Agency theory Hassan and Ahmed (2012); 
Onakoya et al (2014); Obiyo and 
Lenee (2011); Sanda et al (2010); 
Peters and Bagshaw (2014); Ozili 
and Uadiale (2017); Oyejide and 
Soyibo (2001) 
Explaining the principal-agent relationship in 
Nigerian firms, and how it affects performance 
of firms. 
  Patrick et al (2015) Explaining how managerial behavior affects the 
financial reporting process of firms 
  Fodio et al (2013) Explaining the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings quality 
  Rossouw (2008) Used agency theory to assess whether corporate 
governance can balance both corporate and 
societal interests.  
2.  Grounded theory Sorour and Howell (2013) Explaining the nature of corporate governance 
practices in banks, the factors that influence 
such practices and the outcomes of this 
influence. 
3 Stakeholder theory Sanda et al (2010) Illustrates that only few Nigerian studies have 
explored stakeholder theory for the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm 
performance 
  Rossouw (2008); Babatunde and 
Olaniran (2009) 
Explaining the conflict between corporate and 
societal interests when firms are required to 
align both the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society 
4 Institutional theory Adegbite (2015); Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2011). 
 
Explaining how external factors influence 
corporate governance and the ability of the 
board to control and manage the firm. 
5. Conflict-signaling 
theory 
Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) Explaining how CG code multiplicity can 
influence and affect how firms comply with CG 
codes in Nigeria 
6. Resource 
dependency theory 
Ujunwa et al (2012); Peters and 
Bagshaw (2014) 
Explaining the link between firms’ external 
resources, the board and firm performance 
7. Steward ship theory Peters and Bagshaw (2014) Explaining the impact of corporate governance 





6.2. Consequences of corporate governance 
6.2.1. Effect on firm performance 
Sanda et al (2010) investigate the role of good corporate governance mechanisms on the performance 
of 93 listed firms during the 1996 to 1999 period, and find that listed firms run by expatriate CEOs 
perform better than listed firms run by indigenous CEOs. Mohammed (2012) examines the impact of 
corporate governance on the performance of nine (9) Nigerian banks from 2001 to 2010, and find that 
strong corporate governance leads to better performance among banks, however, poor asset quality and 
loan-to-deposit ratios negatively affect bank performance. Ehikioya (2009) examine the relationship 
between corporate governance structure and firm performance using 107 listed firms during the 1998 
to 2002 period, and find that ownership concentration has a positive impact on performance while CEO-
Chair duality and having more than one family member on the Board negatively affects firm 
performance.  
Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
focusing on 62 listed firms during the 2002 and 2006 period, and find that a large board size negatively 
affects firm performance. Paul et al (2015) assess the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the 
performance of microfinance banks in Nigeria. They did not find a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and microfinance banks’ financial performance. Uwalomwa et al (2015) 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the dividend payout policy 
of firms in Nigeria, and find that board size, ownership structure, CEO-Chair duality and board 
independence have a significant and positive effect on the dividend payout decisions of the selected 
firms while Nwidobie (2016) finds that corporate governance has no impact on the dividend policies 
among Nigerian firms. Odeleye (2018) investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
dividend payout in Nigeria for 97 non‐financial listed companies from 1995 to 2012, and find a positive 
and significant association between corporate governance and dividend payout. Amahalu et al (2017) 
examine the effect of corporate governance on firms’ borrowing cost from 2010 to 2015, and find that 
board size, ownership concentration and board independence have a positive and significant effect on 
borrowing cost by decreasing the firms’ cost of capital. Oyewunmi et al (2017) find that there is a 
significant relationship between corporate governance practices and human resource management 
outcomes in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. 
6.2.2. Effect on earnings management 
In theory, strong corporate governance will exert additional monitoring on managers to discourage the 
manipulation of accounting numbers for earnings management purposes (Leuz et al. 2003; Klein 2002). 
Uwuigbe et al (2014) examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management 
in Nigeria from 2007 to 2011. Earnings management was measured using discretionary accruals, and 
they find that board size and board independence have a negative and significant impact on earnings 
management while CEO-Chair duality had a significant and positive impact on earnings management. 
They conclude that firms with larger boards and diverse knowledge are more likely to be effective in 
constraining earnings management than smaller boards because larger boards are more likely to have 
higher numbers of independent directors with more corporate or financial expertise.  
Uadiale (2012) examine the role of the board of directors and audit committee in preventing earnings 
management in Nigeria. The findings reveal that boards dominated by outside directors bring a greater 
breadth of experience to the firm and are in a better position to monitor and control managers thereby 
discouraging earnings management. Abdulmalik and Ahmad (2016a) examine whether good corporate 
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governance improves financial reporting quality and find that the presence of independent non-
executive foreign directors on a board improves financial reporting quality and an increase in the 
percentage of share ownership of foreign institutional shareholders also improves financial reporting 
quality. Usman and Yero (2012) examine the impact of ownership concentration and earnings 
management practice in listed Nigerian firms. They find a negative and significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and earnings management. Dibia and Onwuchekwa (2014) examine the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in Nigeria, and find 
that corporate governance, particularly board size, is negatively associated with earnings management, 
implying that having a larger board size reduces the level of earnings management in Nigerian firms. 
Ojeka et al (2014) examine the impact of audit committee effectiveness on firm performance using four 
characteristics: independence, financial expertise, size and meetings of the audit committee. They find 
that firms that have an independent and knowledgeable audit committee experience higher profitability. 
6.2.3. Effect on financial reporting quality 
Damagum et al (2014) show that the quality of financial reporting improves when there is a higher 
number of women in the board of firms. Moses et al (2016) examine the influence of corporate 
governance on financial reporting quality in listed Nigerian banks. They focus on audit committee 
characteristics as the main corporate governance variable, and find that audit committee independence 
has no significant effect on earnings management in listed Nigerian banks. Kantudu and Samaila (2015) 
examine the impact of board characteristics and independent audit committee on financial reporting 
quality for twelve (12) oil companies during 2000 to 2011. They find that power separation, independent 
directors, managerial shareholdings and independent audit committee significantly improve the quality 
of financial reporting in Nigeria. 
6.2.4. Effect on information disclosure 
Strong corporate governance can exert additional monitoring on firms and can pressure managers to 
increase the quality and quantity of information disclosure to shareholders and outsiders in order to 
reduce the information asymmetry between owners and managers. Studies investigating the effect of 
corporate governance on information disclosure in Nigeria are few. For instance, Odoemelam and 
Okafor (2018) examine the influence of corporate governance on environmental disclosures among 
listed non-financial firms. They find that board independence, board meetings, firm size and the 
environmental committee had a significant effect on environmental disclosure while audit committee 
independence, having a Big 4 auditor, board size and industry membership had an insignificant effect 
on environmental disclosure. Adebimpe and Peace (2011) examine the effect of corporate governance 
on voluntary disclosures among listed firms. They find that board size has a significant and positive 
relationship with the extent of voluntary disclosures while other corporate governance attributes such 
as board composition, leverage, company size, profitability, and auditor type do not have a significant 
effect on voluntary disclosure. Foyeke et al (2015) examine the effect of corporate governance 
disclosure on firm performance during the period when corporate governance disclosure was a 
voluntary requirement for companies in Nigeria. They analyze 137 financial and non-financial 
companies and find a significant and positive relationship between financial performance and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
6.2.5. Effect on Nigerian banks 
Banks are special financial institutions because they deal with depositors’ money, and in practice, banks 
take risk when they issue loans to borrowers (Ozili and Outa 2017). Given their special nature, banks 
need a unique corporate governance structure to ensure that banks’ risk-taking do not put depositors’ 
18 
 
money at risk. In Nigeria, banks have a unique corporate governance structure compared to non-
financial firms. They have a larger board and a few number of insiders on the board compared to non-
financial firms. The board of Nigerian banks are more independent than the board of non-financial 
firms. The unique corporate governance structure of Nigerian banks is due to compliance with the 
Central bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s mandatory corporate governance code for banks in Nigeria. The 
introduction of corporate governance code for Nigerian banks by the CBN in 2005 attracted the attention 
of academics. Some argue that good corporate governance is needed in banks to manage the resources 
of bank particularly where there is management-shareholders separation (Mohammed 2012). Also, one 
significant observation in the literature is the small sample size and the small number of banks which 
are commonly used to test the effect of corporate governance on bank performance. The narrow sample 
size and short sample period is due to the recent adoption of corporate governance codes in Nigeria. 
For example, Abdulazeez et al (2016) examine the impact of corporate governance on the performance 
of all listed deposit money banks in Nigeria using the Pearson correlation and regression analyses. They 
find that larger board size contributes positively and significantly to the performance of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. Okpara and Iheanacho (2014) investigate the impact of corporate governance on 
banking sector performance using discriminant analysis, correlation coefficient and the spearman rank 
correlation as an alternate method. They find that foreign ownership positively improves bank 
performance. Ozili and Uadiale (2017) investigate the role of corporate governance in Nigerian banks 
focusing on the effect of ownership structure on bank profitability. They find that banks with high 
ownership concentration perform better because they have higher return on assets, higher net interest 
margin and higher recurring earning power while banks with dispersed ownership have lower return on 
assets but have higher return on equity. Other studies include: Olayiwola (2010), Okwuchukwu et al 
(2015) and Okpara and Iheanacho (2014). 
 
7. Weaknesses, implication and future research direction 
7.1. Weaknesses of the 2018 Nigerian codes of corporate governance 
One, the Code did not make a distinction between public and private companies. There should be 
separate Codes or sub-codes for private companies, public companies and for non-profit companies 
because of the structural differences in the way the three entities operate, and because of differences in 
capacity to implement the Codes by the three separate entities. Two, the Code did not specify any date 
for implementation although there are expectations that the Code will be effective from January 1, 2020. 
Ideally, Codes of corporate governance should have a date for implementation. Three, the Code is silent 
on whether the board Chairman may sit as a chairman or member of a board committee. Four, the Code 
did not prohibit external auditors from performing non-audit services to the companies they audit. Five, 
the Code omits the requirement that directors should attend at least two-third of all board meetings. Six, 
the Code did not make any provision or guidance on how to address conflicts that may arise from 
conflicting national and sectoral CG codes. It did not clarify whether sectoral codes should be adopted 
when there is conflict between national and sectoral codes or whether the national Code should be 
adopted when there is conflict between national and sectoral codes. Seven, the Code provides that the 
remuneration for non-executive directors (who are also board members) should be determined by the 
board and approved by the shareholders in a general meeting. This means that the 2018 Code allows 
the board to determine the compensation of the board (that is, the non-executive directors), in other 






7.2. Implication for African countries 
 
The Nigerian CG experience offers some lessons and implications for other African countries. 
One, African countries that are in the process of revising their CG codes should adopt the positive ethics 
from modern CG practices in developed countries taking into account the peculiarities of each African 
country. Secondly, new corporate governance codes in African countries should reflect the recent 
developments in corporate governance that have a significant impact on business ethics. Thirdly, the 
lessons from the Nigerian experience suggest that African countries should pay attention to the conflict 
between the national CG code and sectoral CG code, if any, and should develop means to resolve such 
conflict when it arises. Four, African countries should be aware of the limitations of the current CG 
code approach in Nigeria that allows multiple influences on corporate governance codes. It allows 
industry regulators to enforce compliance with the national corporate governance codes while 
neglecting how CG codes work in practice. Finally, the lessons from Nigeria shows that the peculiar 
institutional arrangements in each African country can influence the existing model and style of 
corporate governance regulation, and these institutions can promote the implementation of good 
corporate governance or can constitute barriers to the implementation of good corporate governance 
principles in African countries. 
7.3. Directions for future research 
7.3.1. Additional research on financial firms is needed 
Many studies investigate corporate governance in non-financial firms such as manufacturing 
companies, textile companies, oil companies, etc, but there are only few studies investigating CG 
outcomes in financial firms in Nigeria. There are different types of financial institutions in Nigeria, and 
there is the need to explore the effect of CG on the performance of these financial institutions. More 
research on financial firms is needed, particularly research that examine the impact of CG on insurance 
firms, mutual funds companies and pension companies. Such studies can help us understand whether 
the adoption of the same CG codes by financial firms have the same or dissimilar effect on the 
performance of different types of financial firms such as pension companies, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, etc. 
7.3.2. Explore other corporate governance mechanisms 
The Nigerian CG literature focuses extensively on some governance mechanisms such as board 
characteristics and shareholder ownership structure while ignoring others. The literature ignores other 
governance mechanisms in firms such as CEO characteristics and top management team characteristics. 
Future studies should extend CG research to these areas to provide additional insight into how different 
governance mechanisms might affect the performance of firms in Nigeria.  
7.3.3. Interaction of corporate governance mechanisms 
The board of directors (BOD) is the most explored corporate governance mechanism in the Nigerian 
corporate governance literature. Although the board of directors play an important role in the 
management of financial and non-financial firms, it is important to stress that the activities of the board 
do not occur in a vacuum. The role of the board often interacts with other governance mechanisms such 
as CEO education, skill of top management teams, institutional ownership, capital markets and 
regulation. Future CG studies can examine the interaction between board characteristics and other 




7.3.4. Additional research on CG in SMEs is needed 
Another area of concern is the few corporate governance research on small and medium scale 
enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are catalysts for economic growth, and their survival and performance 
depends on how they are managed to reach their full potential. Many SMEs in Nigeria exist as one-man 
businesses or exist as partnerships, and a large number of SMEs fail while only a few succeed. CG in 
SMEs is a possible explanation for the high rate of failure of SMEs in Nigeria. Yet, there are little or 
no studies investigating the impact of CG on the survival and performance of SMEs in Nigeria. Future 
studies should examine the role of CG on the performance of SMEs. 
7.3.5. Measures of non-financial performance 
Most of the Nigerian CG literature extensively focus on the effect of CG on financial performance with 
little focus on non-financial performance. Financial performance has a major weakness. It does not 
capture the effort that companies put in to improve customer experience, commitment to community 
development, improved employee welfare, corporate social responsibility, and many more. Some non-
financial measures of performance include employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction, good firm 
reputation, reduced litigation against the firm, etc. Non-financial measures of performance are 
important because, when there are two equally profitable firms, an investor is more likely to choose the 
firm that has a higher non-financial performance particularly ethical investors. Future studies should 
investigate whether good CG leads to higher non-financial performance in Nigerian firms. 
7.3.6. CG and estimation non-linearity 
There are non-linear relationships between each CG determinant, and between the CG variables and 
firm performance variables. Future studies should use non-linear models and estimation techniques to 
test the relationship between the CG determinants and firm performance variables. Such models and 
estimation techniques should be well-grounded in theory. Qualitative methods of inquiry can also be 
used to examine non-linear relationship between CG and firm performance. 
7.3.7. Using organizational theory to explain Nigerian CG 
Another area is the use of organizational theory to explain the Nigerian corporate governance 
experience. To date, there are no Nigerian studies that analyze CG in Nigeria using organizational 
theory. Organizations are social units consisting of people that are structured and managed to meet a 
need, or to pursue collective goals. It is interesting to understand how the behavioral attributes of board 
members and top management affects firm performance. Future studies should examine the role of the 
behavioral attribute of board members and top management on the performance of firms in Nigeria. 
Such studies are encouraged to explore how the neoclassical theory, contingency theory and systems 
theory may affect firm performance. Future studies should also examine the impact of organizational 
structure on the ability of the board to govern Nigerian firms.  
7.3.8. Influence of external factors  
Future research should examine how external factors affect the corporate governance structure of 
Nigerian firms. Given that organizations are open systems that continuously adjust to the environment, 
it is important to understand how external events affect the ability of the board and senior management 





Table 4: Future research and directions 
S/N Future research Possible direction 
1 Additional CG research is needed for financial 
firms 
Pension funds, mutual fund firms, investment 
firms, insurance firms 
2 Other corporate governance mechanisms should be 
explored 
Such as top management team characteristics 
3 The interaction between two or more corporate 
governance mechanisms should be explored 
Such as the interaction of board 
composition/structure with CEO and top 
management teams characteristics 
4 Additional research on CG in SMEs is needed 
 
Such studies should focus on small businesses 
and medium-size businesses  
5 Measures of non-financial performance Such studies should use measures of employee 
satisfaction, customer satisfaction, firm 
reputation, etc. 
6 There is need for more studies that take into 
account the non-linearity in CG modelling 
The use of general methods of moments 
(GMM) with instrumental variables can be 
useful 
7 Organizational theory and perspectives can explain 
the Nigerian CG experience. 
Such studies can use contingency theory, 
system theory, or the neoclassical 
organizational theory 
8 Future studies should consider the influence of 
external factors on Nigerian CG. 
Such as the effect of investor protection, 





This paper reviewed the Nigerian corporate governance literature. It discussed the current state of 
corporate governance research in Nigeria, and provided some directions for future research on CG in 
Nigeria.  
The review of the literature revealed that: (i) research on the contribution of the board of directors to 
firm performance has dominated the Nigerian CG literature in the last decade; (ii) the recent advances 
in the Nigerian CG literature were attributed to the new challenges companies face in Nigeria and the 
theoretical advancements in the wider corporate governance literature; (iii) effective corporate 
governance reduces the ownership and control problems in firms, and leads to improved firm 
performance in Nigeria; (iv) corporate governance in Nigeria is faced with challenges related to 
institutional weaknesses, regulatory multiplicity and non-compliance issues; (v) the Nigerian CG 
literature draws a clear line between the shareholder and the manager using agency theory; and (vi) 
many empirical CG studies in Nigeria continue to report mixed results in several areas.  
One limitation of this review paper is the lack of robustness due to the absence of empirical data to 
conduct robust analyses.  
Future research in this area can compare the Nigerian CG experience with the CG experience in other 
countries. Also, future research should explore the role of corporate boards in reducing financial risks 
in listed firms. Future studies can also explore the interaction between macro and micro factors, and 
how these forces jointly shape the relationship between board of directors and firm performance. 
Finally, future studies can explore the influence of culture, corruption, politics and religion on corporate 
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